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BID IMPERFECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
CONTRACTING: CARVING OUT A GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE VOID CONTRACT RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Public contracting enables our country to grow and
prosper.2 Each year, billions of tax dollars are spent by our
federal, state, and municipal governments on bridges, build-
ings, roads, and utilities.3 Because so much money is at
stake, the public demands assurances that its funds are be-
ing reasonably spent.4 Accordingly, governments have estab-
lished strict rules regulating the public contract procurement
process.
One well established procurement rule requires that all
public contracts be sent out for competitive bidding to all in-
terested parties. This process is intended to create "full and
open competition" among bidders by placing all those inter-
ested in the contract on a level playing field.7 However, many
disputes arise out of this formal process. For example, bid-
ders that are not awarded a contract often bring claims
against both the prevailing contractor and the public entity.
Such claims assert, for example, that the prevailing contrac-
tor wrongfully obtained the contract because a submitted bid
did not conform to the precise bid specifications. Some im-
portant questions have arisen when claims of this nature ul-
1. A public contract is any contract with a "state, county, city, city and
county, district, public authority, public agency, municipal corporation, or any
other political subdivision or public corporation in a state." See generally CAL.
PUB. CONT. CODE § 1100 (Deering 1982). The term "public contract" includes
within its scope "public works contracts" which are "agreements for the erec-
tion, construction, alteration, repair, or improvement of any public structure,
building, road, or other public improvement of any kind." See generally id.
at § 1101.
2. Gene Ming Lee, A Case For Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1996).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1095. Such rules were established to prevent corruption, mini-
mize costs, and provide a fair deal to the tax payer. Id. at 1093.
6. In public contracting, a bid is an offer to provide the materials and
services described in the plans and specifications for a certain price. Id. at
1083.
7. Lee, supra note 2, at 1094.
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timately prevail. This comment attempts to address these
questions.
In the realm of California public contracting, two recent
appellate court decisions expose the uncertainties that result
from bid imperfections during the procurement process. Val-
ley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City of Davis' illustrates some of
the questions that can arise when a claim alleging unfair
bidding practices is brought by a losing bidder. The Valley
Crest decision has raised serious doubts over the ability of a
California contractor, performing work on a state or local
project, to obtain payment for its services This issue arises
when a court finds a contract void, after performance on the
contract has commenced, due to a technical error in a bid
submitted prior to performance. Valley Crest, as well as the
more recent decision of Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacra-
mento Regional County Sanitation District,9 have put Cali-
fornia public contractors in serious jeopardy of not being paid
for work performed if a technical defect in the bidding proc-
ess renders the contract void.1'
The following questions raised in Valley Crest and Mon-
terey Mechanical have yet to be addressed by any California
court. When a public contract is declared void because of a
technical defect in a submitted bid, should the contractor who
has performed work under the contract be paid or should the
agency be absolved of the obligation of making any pay-
ments?'2 If the agency is absolved of this obligation, should
the agency be entitled to reimbursement of all monies paid to
the contractor?
3
This comment will propose solutions to these specific
questions 4 as well as other related problems that arise in bid
imperfection cases. 5 Section II, the background section, 6
8. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
9. Robert W. O'Conner & Linda Beck, More About Valley Crest and Pro-
posals For Remedial Legislation, unnumbered cover page (Oct. 1996)
(unpublished article submitted for the 13th Annual Legal Retreat, on file at the
Associated General Contractors of California office in Sacramento). The
authors serve on the Legal Advisory Committee of the Associated General Con-
tractors of California. Id. at unnumbered app.
10. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
11. O'Conner & Beck, supra note 9, at unnumbered cover page.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part V.
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first describes what transpired in Valley Crest and Monterey
Mechanical.17 Second, this section traces the relevant Cali-
fornia precedent which has denied contractor recovery for
performance on void public contracts. 8 Third, for compari-
son, this section examines California cases which allow pay-
ment to contractors despite violations in bidding laws.'9
Fourth, the background also provides an explanation of the
restitutionary theory of quantum meruit. ° Finally, this sec-
tion concludes with a survey of federal and state cases that
have addressed the issue of quantum meruit recovery on void
public contracts.'
Section III identifies the problems inherent in public con-
tracts laced with bid defects, and poses specific questions
that pertain to the contractor, the public agency, and the
losing bidder in these cases.2 Section IV analyzes these is-
23
sues.
Section V, the proposal section, offers the following as-
sertions as a response to the problems that arise in bid im-
perfection cases.'4 First, contractors should be allowed to re-
cover for performance on public contracts that are
retroactively declared void as a result of a technical flaw in a
submitted bid, as long as good faith competitive bidding oc-
curred." Second, a bidder who is wrongfully denied a con-
tract ought to recover from a public entity for reasonable
costs incurred in bid preparation and related litigation. 6
Third, California precedent, denying quantum meruit recov-
ery on void public contracts, should not be extended to in-
clude situations where the competitive bidding procedure
took place but was technically flawed. 7 Fourth, courts in the
future should refuse to declare a contract void after perform-
ance has begun, despite a later determined error in the bid-
ding process, as long as the contracting parties acted in good
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.A-B.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See infra Part II.E.
21. See infra Part II.F.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part V.A.
26. See infra Part V.B.
27. See infra Part V.C.
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faith. 28 Furthermore, courts, in assessing whether the com-
petitive bidding process took place, should not base their
findings on the speculative question of the revocability of a
contractor's bid bond.29 Finally, the proposal suggests the
type of new legislation that would produce more efficient and
timely resolution of bid disputes."
The conclusion of this comment urges that the proposals
set forth in Section V be implemented in order to diminish
the uncertainties present in California public contracting.
This good faith exception to the "void contract" rule would
provide a more secure future for contractors.31
II. BACKGROUND
Two recent California appellate cases have given rise to
the issue of whether a contractor should be allowed to retain
payment for work performed if a court declares its public con-
tract void because of an error in the bidding process.32 This
issue arises even after performance on the contract has been
substantially completed. The two decisions, Valley Crest"
and Monterey Mechanical," best illustrate this issue as they
offer two different examples of the problems that can occur
when a bid dispute arises after a contract award.
A. The Valley Crest Case
In Valley Crest, the City of Davis ("City") solicited bids
for the construction of a park project.35 The specifications
provided that the contractor's own organization was to per-
form work amounting to no less than 50% of the original con-
tract price.36 Of the four bids the City received, North Bay
Construction ("North Bay") had the lowest bid at
28. See infra Part V.D.
29. See infra Part V.E.
30. See infra Part V.F.
31. See infra Part VI.
32. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City of
Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
33. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996).
34. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
35. Valley Crest, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
36. Id. at 187.
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$4,077,675. 2' Valley Crest submitted the next lowest bid at
$4,088,000.38 However, North Bay listed in its bid that 83%
of the work was to be done by subcontractors.39
After the bids were opened," Valley Crest protested
North Bay's bid as nonresponsive.4 ' Valley Crest argued that
North Bay's bid violated the bidding requirements by listing
that 83% of the work was to be subcontracted.42 Thereafter,
the City contacted North Bay and told the company that its
bid would be deemed nonresponsive. 4  In response, North
Bay told the City that the percentages were incorrect and
submitted revised subcontractor percentages that totaled
44.65%. 4 The contract was then awarded to North Bay by
the City Council based on the revised bid.45 Apparently, the
City Council based its decision on a recommendation by the
city attorney to waive the bid irregularity because she felt it
did not give North Bay a competitive advantage over other
bidders.46
Valley Crest filed suit and sought a declaration that
North Bay's contract be declared void, an order prohibiting
performance, and an order compelling recovery of any con-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. This bid violated the City's standard specification that the prime
contractor perform at least 50% of the work. Eileen M. Diepenbrock, Public
Contract Based on Materially Nonresponsive Bid Revised After Bid Opening Is
Void 1 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished article submitted for the 13th Annual Legal Re-
treat, on file at the Associated General Contractors of California office in Sac-
ramento). Eileen Diepenbrock serves on the Legal Advisory Committee of the
Associated General Contractors of California. Id. at unnumbered app.
40. All bids are submitted in sealed envelopes and opened publicly at the
time and place set out in the Invitation to Bid. Lee, supra note 2, at 1095.
41. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In order to be accepted, a contractor's bid must
be the lowest monetary bid and also a "responsive" one. David E. Rosengren
and Thomas G. Librizzi, Bid Protests: Substance and Procedure on Publicly
Funded Construction Projects, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, Jan. 1987, at 11. To be
considered a responsive bid, the bid must be in strict and full accordance with
the material terms of the invitation for bids. Id. A contractor is not allowed to
correct a material nonresponsive bid after bid opening. However, minor or im-
material omissions in a bid can be waived. Id. The contractor must also be
considered a "responsible bidder." Id. The term "responsible bidder" refers to
the contractor's ability to perform the proposed work. Id. at 13.
42. Valley Crest, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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tract payments already made.47 The trial court denied the
petition and entered judgment for the City and North Bay.48
1. Appellate Review of Valley Crest
Appealing the trial court judgment, Valley Crest argued
that North Bay was improperly allowed to change its bid49
and that such a revision of its original bid after bid opening
violated the bid mistake statutes." The respondents, the
City and North Bay, asserted that the 50% requirement was
not waived and that North Bay just misstated the subcon-
tractor percentages. 5 Siding with Valley Crest, however, the
court concluded that the change in subcontractor percentages
was a material element that could not be altered.52 The court
explained that even if the change in the percentages was a
result of a clerical error, the doctrine allowing waiver of in-
consequential irregularities 3 would not allow such a change.54
As a result, the court found that North Bay had an unfair ad-
vantage because it could have withdrawn its bid and recov-
ered its bid bond.55 Therefore, because North Bay's bid was
nonresponsive, the appellate court reversed the trial court
and ruled the contract void.56 The case was remanded to the
47. Diepenbrock, supra note 39, at 2.
48. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
49. Id. at 188.
50. Id. at 189 (referring to CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE. §§ 5101, 5105 (Deering
(1982)); see also infra note 53 for a general explanation of bid mistake rules.
51. Valley Crest, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190.
52. Id.
53. The general rule in competitive bidding is that bids must conform to the
required specifications. Id. at 189. If the bid does not conform, it must be re-jected. Id. However, if a bid substantially conforms to a call for bids, although
not strictly responsive, it may be accepted if the variance does not affect the bid
amount or give the bidder an advantage not allowed other bidders. Id. at 190.
This is deemed a waivable inconsequential irregularity. Id.
54. Valley Crest, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190.
55. Id. A bid bond is normally required to be submitted with a contractor's
bid on all public contracts. A bid bond typically amounts to a percentage of the
total amount of the bid (i.e. 10%). If the contractor submits a bid, is awarded
the job, and then refuses to perform, the public entity can collect on the face
value of the bid bond. Contractors usually obtain such bonds from a surety.
The Valley Crest court used the rationale in Menefee v. County of Fresno, which
held that any waiver of an irregularity should only be permitted if it would not
give the bidder an unfair advantage by allowing the bidder to withdraw its bid
without losing its bid bond. Id. (citing Menefee v. County of Fresno, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 99, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
56. Id. at 191.
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57trial court with orders to conform with the opinion.
By the time the appellate court rendered its judgment,
the contract was approximately 98% complete.58 Of the ad-
justed contract price of $4.1 million, about $3.4 million had
already been paid to North Bay.59 North Bay and the City
filed petitions for rehearing, challenging the court's determi-
nation that the contract was void and arguing that this find-
ing would lead to inequitable results which would disallow
contractors from receiving any payment for work performed
on void contracts." The appellate court, after initially deny-
ing the petition, modified its opinion,6' asserting that it ex-
pressed no opinion on "North Bay's right to recover in quasi-
contract or some other theory for the reasonable value of la-
bor and materials."62 However, it did cite a list of cases that
disallow payment on void public contracts.63
2. Valley Crest Proceedings After Remand
Relying on theories of quantum meruit and equitable es-
toppel,64 the City and North Bay moved that the City be al-
lowed to pay North Bay for the reasonable value of work
completed, as well as retain North Bay for the completion of
the project.65 Valley Crest opposed these motions and moved
to amend its petition to seek a claim for damages." The case
was eventually settled prior to any ruling of the trial court.67
57. Id.
58. Diepenbrock, supra note 39, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184, 191 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
63. Id. (citing Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942); Greer v. Hitch-
cock, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Ct. App. 1969); Gamewell F.A.T. Co. v. Los Angeles, 187
P. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919); Reams v. Cooley, 152 P. 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915);
Zottman v. San Francisco, 81 Am. Dec. 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1862)).
64. An action in quantum meruit allows recovery "for services performed for
another on the basis of a contract implied in law or an implied promise to pay
the performer for what the services were reasonably worth." BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 387 (3d ed. 1991). An equitable estoppel is an estoppel that "arises
out' of a person's statement of fact, or out of his silence, acts, or omissions,
rather than from a deed or record or written contract." Id. at 167.
65. Diepenbrock, supra note 39, at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id.
1997]
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B. The Monterey Mechanical Case
Monterey Mechanical followed Valley Crest. The Mon-
terey Mechanical decision answered questions of first impres-
sion regarding affirmative action requirements for contrac-
tors on public works68 contracts.69 This case involved Public
Contract Code7" section 2000 which includes the ten criteria
that help determine whether a contractor used "good faith"
efforts in trying to meet Minority Business Enterprise and
Women Business Enterprise (MBE/WBE) goals.7' Although
the "good faith" issue may be considered moot with voter ap-
proval of Proposition 209 in 1996,72 the issue of whether a
public contractor is entitled to payment on a contract de-
clared void because of a defect in the bidding process remains
unresolved.
1. The Facts of Monterey Mechanical
In Monterey Mechanical, the Sacramento Regional
County Sanitation District ("public agency") solicited bids for
construction of a wastewater treatment plant.73 Incorporated
into the contract was a clause pertaining to section 005877'
68. Public works contracts are agreements for the erection, construction,
alteration, repair, or improvement of any public structure, building, road, or
other public improvement of any kind. See generally CAL. PUB. CONT.
CODE § 1101 (Deering 1982). See also supra note 1.
69. Elmer R. Malakoff, Some Perspectives on Two Recent Public Works Con-
struction Bid Dispute Cases (The Monterey Mechanical Case and the Valley
Crest Case) 1 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished article submitted for the AGC California
13th Annual Legal Retreat, on file at the Associated General Contractors of
California office in Sacramento). Elmer Malakoff served on the Legal Advisory
Committee of the Associated General Contractors of California. Id. at unnum-
bered app.
70. The California Public Contract Code applies to all contracts awarded
under the State Contract Act. JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW
MANUAL 271 (William D. Mahoney ed., 4th ed. 1997).
71. Malakoff, supra note 69, at 1.
72. Proposition 209, also known as the California Civil Rights Initiative,
passed in California in the November 5, 1996 election. Coalition for Econ.
Equal. v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement or implementation of Proposition 209),
vacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, No. 97-369, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 6506 (November 3, 1997).
Among other things, the amendment outlaws racial and gender based affirma-
tive action programs on public projects solely funded by state or local govern-
ments in California. See 946 F. Supp. at 1488.
73. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
74. Section 00587 is not found in the California Public Contracts Code. Id.
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entitled "Minority Owned and Women Owned Business En-
terprise Participation Requirements."75 This section set the
public agency's goals for Minority Owned Business Enter-
prises (MBEs) at 12.5% and Women Owned Business Enter-
prise (WBEs) at 9.5%." Section 00587 also listed criteria" for
assessing what constitutes a "good faith effort," which dif-
fered from those in California Public Contract Code section
2000.78 Monterey Mechanical ("Monterey") tried to meet
MBE and WBE goals, but was unsuccessful.79 However,
Monterey was the low bidder on the contract at $65.8 million,
while another contractor, Hoffman/Marmolejo, was the sec-
ond lowest bidder at $66.475 million.8" Because Monterey did
not meet the MBE/WBE goals, it submitted documentation to
show that it had made a "good faith effort" to do so.81
Applying section 00587 criteria, the public agency con-
cluded that Monterey's bid was nonresponsive because it
failed to show that Monterey had indeed made a "good faith
effort" to achieve the MBE/WBE goals. 2 The public agency
awarded the contract to the second lowest bidder, Hoff-
man/Marmolejo, obligating itself to pay nearly $700,000 more
on the contract than it would have had it accepted Monterey's
low bid.83 The trial court denied Monterey's petition to set
aside the contract award to Hoffman/Marmolejo, finding that
the public agency did not abuse its discretion in utilizing sec-
tion 00587 criteria to determine that Monterey did not satisfy
the good faith requirement.84
at 399 n.2. It is unclear where section 00587 was originally taken from, but the
court assumed it was part of a local ordinance applicable to the District. Id.
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id.
77. Section 00587 criteria requires one of three elements to be satisfied in
order for a bid to be considered responsive and, therefore, the bidder eligible for
award of the contract: (1) the bidder must be a certified MBE or WBE; (2) meet
or exceed the stated MBE/WBE goals; or (3) demonstrate, to the satisfaction of
the public agency, fulfillment of good faith efforts to achieve these goals. Id.
78. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See CAL. PUB. CONT.
CODE § 2000(b) (West Supp. 1997) for full text of the ten criteria of § 2000.
79. Monterey Mechanical Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
21319971
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2. Appellate Review of Monterey
Monterey appealed, arguing that the lower court erred in
its ruling because the public agency wrongfully utilized the
criteria in section 00587 to determine what constituted a
good faith effort.85 Monterey argued that the public agency
was restricted to applying only the criteria of section 2000 to
determine whether Monterey originally met the "good faith"
requirement.86 The appellate court agreed with Monterey
and held that because the public agency applied the wrong
criteria in reaching its decision, the agency abused its discre-
tion.87  The court set aside the contract award to Hoff-
man/Marmolejo and ordered that Monterey's good faith effort
be re-evaluated using the ten criteria of section 2000.88 At
this point, Hoffman/Marmolejo had completed about two-
thirds of the work over a two year period and had been paid
approximately $44 million on their $65.8 million contract.89
If all the bids were then rejected, delay of the project
would have resulted in an extreme risk to public health as
the capacity of the existing wastewater treatment plant could
be exceeded.9" Furthermore, the public agency had obliga-
tions to third parties which would result in large liquidated
damage payments being assessed on the agency if the project
was not completed on schedule.9' Additionally, substantial
claims from Monterey would likely arise if Monterey was now
awarded the job since Monterey had lost its original subcon-
tractor commitments and the scope of the project had been
significantly reduced. To resolve this dilemma, the public
agency paid a settlement of some three million dollars to
Monterey.93
C. California Precedent Disallowing Payment to Contractors
for Performance on Contracts Later Declared Void
To try and answer the questions raised in Valley Crest
85. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 408.
88. Id.
89. Malakoff, supra note 69, at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
214 [Vol. 38
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and Monterey Mechanical, one must first consider one of the
earliest California Supreme Court cases on the issue of a con-
tractor's right to recover on a contract that is later declared
void-Miller v. McKinnon.94 The Valley Crest opinion cited
Miller when the court modified its ruling.95 In its modified
ruling, the court explained that the Valley Crest holding was
not meant to and did not express the court's opinion on a con-
tractor's right to recover in quasi-contract or other theory for
the reasonable value of labor and materials.96
In Miller, a taxpayer brought an action on behalf of the
county to recover money illegally spent by the county on a
construction project not properly let out for public bidding. 7
The court implicitly held the contract void." The court ruled
that when a public entity illegally awards a contract without
sending it out for competitive bidding and the contractor
supplies labor and materials in performance of the contract,
the contractor does so at its peril and has no right to recover
the reasonable value of its services." The court reasoned
that if recovery was permitted, then the competitive bidding
requirement would be circumvented' and the public agency
could have the work done, pay for the work, and leave the
taxpayers without a remedy.'
D. California Precedent Allowing Payment to Contractors for
Performance on Contracts Awarded in Violation of
Bidding Laws
It is also important to review previous California cases
that have allowed recovery under contracts that were wrong-
fully awarded. Significantly, in all of these cases, the court
avoided declaring the contract void.
In Chas R. McCormick Lumber Co. v. Highland School
District,' a public entity was required to render payment for
94. Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942).
95. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
96. Id. See infra Part IV.A for an analysis of the court's rationale in citing
Miller and other cases.
97. Miller, 124 P.2d at 37.
98. Id. at 38. See dicta discussing how no implied liability can arise from
benefits received by a public agency on a contract that is void. Id. at 39.
99. Id. at 38.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 147 P. 1183 (Cal. 1915).
1997] 215
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goods and services received following a bid award later de-
termined to be defective because an advertisement for bids
was not placed in the newspaper."3 It has been argued that
McCormick, cited by the supreme court in Miller, established
a rule for cases involving insufficient compliance with com-
petitive bidding requirements, as opposed to cases, such as
Miller, where no competitive bidding process ever took
place. 104
More recently, in Konica Business Machines v. Regents of
the University of California,"' an action was brought by an
unsuccessful bidder on a contract to supply a state university
with photocopy machines when the low bidder, Copy-Line,
was awarded the contract on a bid that deviated from the
specifications.' The court of appeal found that an error in
the bidding process had occurred, but did not expressly rule
the contract "void."0 7 The court authorized continued per-
formance and payment under the "vacated" contract pending
rebid of the remaining work, stating that "there is no legal
impediment to requiring Copy-Line to service the Univer-
sity's needs on a per diem basis at the present contract rate,
and requiring the University to pay on that basis."'0 8 The
court expressed no opinion on the reimbursement rights of
Copy-Line if it was not awarded the contract on rebid."°9
In the most recent case, Ghilotti Construction Co. v. City
of Richmond,11 ° an unsuccessful bidder challenged a bid
award because the winning contractor's bid deviated from
contract specifications. 1 Although the lowest bidder had
proposed to subcontract more than 55% of the work in viola-
tion of the contract's 50% limit,"' the court held that the bid
could be brought into compliance with only slight alterations
and without affecting the amount of the bid."3 The court af-
103. Id.
104. This was unsuccessfully argued in a Petition for Rehearing that was
submitted by the Respondents (the City) in Valley Crest. See O'Conner & Beck,
supra note 9, at 4.
105. 253 Cal. Rptr. 591, 592 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
106. Id. at 592.
107. Id. at 596.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
111. Id. at 390.
112. Id. at 397.
113. Id. at 395.
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firmed the contract and held that the public entity merely
waived an "inconsequential irregularity.""4  The court was
satisfied that the contract award was fully consistent with
public policy concerns and that there was "no evidence of fa-
voritism, corruption, fraud, extravagance, or uncompetitive
bidding practices.""5 Although the facts of Valley Crest were
nearly identical to those of Ghilotti, this court distinguished
Valley Crest in reaching its holding. 116 The court stated that
to the extent that its reasoning differed from that of Valley
Crest, it respectfully disagreed."7
E. The Restitution Theory of Quantum Meruit
If somebody mistakenly confers a benefit on another, of-
ten the only remedy is restitution."8 At common law, the
courts developed a restitutionary device known as a "quasi-
contract" which was based on an action in assumpsit."9 This
implied contract was made by the courts and required pay-
ment to a plaintiff for the amount of unjust enrichment.12
One such remedy that spawned out of this restitutionary
principle was an action in quantum meruit.'2'
The translation of the Latin phrase quantum meruit is
"as much as he deserves."'22 An action in quantum meruit
seeks to establish liability for a contract implied in law-it
creates a contract that arises from the "law of natural justice
and equity."'22 For example, if a contract is unenforceable for
some reason, a plaintiff can rely on the theory of quantum
meruit to recover the value of any work performed under the
114. Id. at 389; see also supra note 53.
115. Id. at 396.
116. See Ghilotti Constr. Co. v. City of Richmond, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 396-
98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Ghilotti was decided shortly after both Valley Crest
and Monterey Mechanical.
117. Id. at 396.
118. ELAINE W. SHOBEN & WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, REMEDIES: CASE AND
PROBLEMS 770 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 2d ed., 1995).
119. Id. Actions in assumpsit are proper even if there is an express contract.
Id. For example, when a plaintiff has not fully performed on a contract, but the
non-performance is excusable, an action in assumpsit may lie. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 387 (3d ed. 1991). Historically, the action of
assumpsit allowed recovery "for services performed for another on the basis of a
contract implied in law or an implied promise to pay for the performance for
what the services were reasonably worth." Id.
123. Id.
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mistaken belief that there was a valid contract.' The idea
behind quantum meruit is that were it not for this restitution
action, the defendant would be unjustly enriched at the
plaintiffs expense."' Accordingly, the underlying issues are
whether the defendant has, in fact, been enriched and
whether it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the
enrichment."6
F. Federal and State Cases Addressing the Issue of Quantum
Meruit Recovery on Void Public Contracts
Both federal and state courts have considered the issue
of whether a contractor can recover on a contract that is ul-
timately deemed void. These decisions are helpful in ana-
lyzing this question that remains unresolved in California.
1. Quantum Meruit Recovery in Federal Cases on Void
Government Contracts
Because many state courts often look to judgments of
federal courts for guidance in public contract law,1 27 it is ap-
propriate to analyze federal cases that have ruled on the is-
sue of recovery on void contracts.
The principle of allowing a government contractor to ob-
tain relief on an illegal contract is deeply rooted in century
old Supreme Court precedent."8 In Clark v. United States,
the federal government orally contracted with a party to use
a ship.' However, there was a statutory provision which re-
quired that all government contracts be in writing."' The
ship was destroyed while in possession of the government
and the owner brought suit against the government for the
loss. 132 The Supreme Court held that, although the contract
124. SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 118, at 770.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 771.
127. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Alaska Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facili-
ties, 765 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Alaska 1988).
128. Michael T. Janik and Margaret C. Rhodes, Gould, Inc. v. United States:
Contractor Claims for Relief Under Illegal Contracts with the Government, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1956 (1996) (citing Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539,
544 (1877) (awarding damages to claimant despite finding that contract was
illegal because not in writing)).
129. 95 U.S. 539 (1877).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 541.
132. Id. at 540.
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was void, the contractor was still entitled to relief under a
quantum meruit theory.183 The court reasoned that the
claimant still had rights that arose out of an implied contract
with the government. '34
Many federal courts, following Clark, have allowed quan-
tum meruit recovery to contractors who undertake express
contracts with the government that are later found void.'
For example, in New York Mail & Newspaper Transportation
Co. v. United States,'36 a contract between the government
and a contractor was rescinded. ' The contractor sued for
breach of contract. 3 ' The court found that the contract was
void because it was awarded in violation of an applicable
statute.'39 However, the court allowed relief in quantum
meruit.'4 ° It justified the relief on the principle that when
one party has performed in whole or in part, the performing
party should be reimbursed for the fair value of its property
or services. '
In contrast, some courts have denied quantum meruit re-
covery on void government contracts.' 3 Yet, many of these
cases involve situations where there was never an express
contract with the government.' Additionally, a large num-
ber of courts deny quantum meruit recovery to contractors in
situations tainted with fraud, bribery, or collusion.'
133. Id. at 542.
134. Id. at 541.
135. Janik & Rhodes, supra note 128, at 1961-62.
136. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
137. Id. at 272.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 276.
140. Id.
141. New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp.
271, 276 (Ct. Cl. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957); see also United States
v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961); Crocker v. United
States, 240 U.S. 74 (1916); United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (allowing contractor to recover payment due on void contract
using a quantum meruit theory because government had accepted conforming
goods and services); Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(allowing quantum meruit recovery after ruling an illegal contract had been
formed because the government had agreed to pay on the contract and had re-
ceived the benefits from it).
142. Judy Beckner Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DE
PAUL L. REV. 399, 454 n.330 (1992) (citing Haberman v. United States, 18 Cl.
Ct. 302 (Cl. Ct. 1989); Gary v. Rankin, 721 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Miss. 1989)).
143. Id.
144. Sheridan Strickland, Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd.-
19971 219
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Courts which allow public contractors quantum meruit
recovery on void contracts typically determine the recover-
able monetary damages by looking at the benefit that has
been conferred on the government.'45 This is the standard
measure of damages for recovery on a contract implied in
law.146 However, other courts calculate the amount recover-
able by determining the fair market value of the contractor's
services.'47
2. Quantum Meruit Recovery in State Cases on Void
Public Contracts
Many state courts outside of California have allowed
quantum meruit recovery on void public contracts. For ex-
ample in Noel v. Cole,'48 the Washington supreme court held
that when a public entity has the general authority to award
a contract, but the award is "technically or procedurally
flawed" in violation of a statute, a contractor can recover on a
theory of quantum meruit as long as the award "is not
marked by fraud or bad faith and does not manifestly contra-
vene public policy.""" Similar reasoning has been employed
Time for Adoption of a Void Contract Remedy for Alaska Public Contracting
Authorities, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 227, 238 (1989) (citing Pan Am. Petroleum &
Transp. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1926); K & R Eng'g Co. v. United
States, 616 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Miller v. City of Martinez, 82 P.2d 519 (Cal.
1938); Shasta County v. Moody, 265 P. 1032 (Cal. 1928); Thomson v. Call, 699
P.2d 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); McNay v.
Town of Lowell, 84 N.E. 778 (Ind. 1908); Kunkle Water & Elec., Inc. v. City of
Prescott, 347 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 1984); Kansas City v. Halvorson, 177 S.W.2d
495 (Mo. 1944); S.T. Grand, Inc. v City of New York, 298 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1973); Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 239 N.E.2d 197
(N.Y. 1968); Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County, 90 S.E.2d 496 (N.C.
1955)).
145. United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
146. Sloan, supra note 142, at 452 (citing FREDRICK C. WOODWARD, THE LAW
OF QUASI CONTRACTS 5 (1913)).
147. Id. at 454 (citing Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 421 F.2d 293 (5th
Cir. 1969); Clark v. United States, 95 U.S. 539 (1887)).
148. 655 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1982).
149. Noel v. Cole, 655 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. 1982); Earthmovers of Fair-
banks, Inc. v. Department of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 765 P.2d 1360, 1368
(Alaska 1988) (stating a party acting in good faith may recover the reasonable
value of his services so as to prevent injustice or unjust enrichment); see also
Schipper v. City of Aurora, 22 N.E. 878, 879 (N.Y. 1889) (holding if a munici-
pality receives a benefit of money, labor, or property on a contract that is made
without authority or due formality which it refuses to execute, it is liable to the
person who confers the benefit unless the contract was in violation of public
policy or prohibited by statute); Boyd v. Black School, 23 N.E. 862, 863 (N.Y.
1889) (holding if the contract is found to be invalid because of noncompliance
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by other state courts. These courts have held that if a public
contract is void, but the parties acted in good faith and were
honest in their dealings, a contractor may recover in quan-
tum meruit for as much as he or she reasonably deserves so
as to prevent unjust enrichment.'
Courts have consistently used the doctrine of unjust en-
richment when there is no contract, but the public entity
reaps benefits from the other party.' However, these prin-
ciples are generally inapplicable when the contract is "ultra
vires."152 Moreover, other state courts have denied contractor
recovery on void public contracts where the contract was not
properly let out to competitive bidding, despite a showing of
good faith."3 Additionally, some courts have taken a middle
with a statute, the right to recover is not in contract but upon the fact that the
public entity received the benefit); Edwards v. City of Renton, 409 P.2d 153
(Wash. 1965) (holding if a contractor renders performance on a void contract it
may be able to recover in quantum meruit).
150. A.V. Smith Constr. Co. v. Midland Cas. Co., 450 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Fullerton v. Scarecrow Club, Inc., 440 So. 2d 945 (La. Ct.
App. 1983)); Jones v. City of Lake Charles, 295 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1974);
see also Capital Bridge Co. v. County of Saunders, 83 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Neb. 1957)
(holding that if a municipality enters into a contract in good faith which was
within the municipality's authority to make, but which is void because of non-
compliance with bidding requirements, a quantum meruit action for the service
performed or material furnished is permitted). In Capital Bridge, recovery was
limited to what would have been recoverable if the contract was valid. Id.
151. A.V. Smith Constr. Co. v. Midland Cas. Co., 450 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Hinkle v. City of West Monroe, 200 So. 468 (La. 1941)); Brock
v. Town of Kentwood, 199 So. 133 (La. 1940); see also Minyard v. Curtis Prod-
ucts, Inc., 205 So. 2d 422, 432 (La. 1967) (listing Louisiana Supreme Court ele-
ments necessary for recovery under unjust enrichment as: (1) an enrichment,
(2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection between the enrichment and the re-
sulting impoverishment, (4) an absence of justification for the enrichment or
impoverishment, and (5) the absence of any other remedy at law).
152. A contract is considered "ultra vires" when it is completely beyond the
scope of the public entity's authority under any instances. Earthmovers of
Fairbanks, Inc. v. Department of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 765 P.2d 1360, 1368
(Alaska 1988). Some state courts employ the assumpsit doctrine to analyze the
enforceability of public contracts. Id. at 1368. The underlying principle of the
assumpsit doctrine is to "protect the citizens and taxpayers from unjust, ill-
considered or extortionate contracts, or those showing favoritism." Id. at 1369.
153. Maucher v. City of Eloy, 701 P.2d 593, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). Quan-
tum meruit recovery was not allowed when it would circumvent the conflict of
interest statute allowing the city to retain the benefits of the contract and then
void it. Id. The court reasoned that even if the contractor and public official
were acting in good faith, if restitution was allowed, the policy of the conflict of
interest statute would be undermined. Id. The court felt that if corrupt public
officials and contractors realized that they could recover at least restitution if
caught in an illegal contract, they would likely be willing to attempt unbidden
contracts. Id. The court held that the policy against unjust enrichment "must
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ground approach by not giving the contractor full recovery of
the money owed on the void contract but allowing them to re-
tain either monies already received or to recover for the ex-
penses incurred.'
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND ISSUES PRESENTED
The two cases, Valley Crest55 and Monterey Mechani-
cal," 6 illustrate the serious problem that arises due to bid
imperfections in the course of public contracting. The cases
present two different scenarios that can occur. In the first
scenario, the public agency awards the contract to the low
bidding contractor, despite a flaw in the contractor's bid. In
the second scenario, the public agency rejects the low bidding
contractor because it mistakenly determined a flaw in the
contractor's bid and awards the contract to another bidder.
As these leading cases illustrate, in either scenario, a con-
tract may later be declared void by a court even after sub-
stantial completion of the contracted project.
Valley Crest and Monterey Mechanical raise the following
questions that have yet to be addressed by a California court.
When a public contract is declared void because of a defect in
the bidding process, should the contractor who has performed
work under the contract be paid or should the agency be
bow" to the underlying policy of the statute. Id.
154. In Twohy Bros. Co., the Oregon Supreme Court held that a construction
company was not allowed to recover for a substantial sum of money that re-
mained to be paid on the void public contract because the contract was not
properly let out for competitive bidding. Twohy Bros. Co. v. Ochoco Irr. Dist. of
Crook County, 210 P. 873, 884 (Or. 1922). However, the court allowed the con-
tractor to retain the money that had already been paid on the void contract
which amounted to over $300,000. Id. The court chose to leave the parties as
they were. Id. See also J & J Contractors v. State of Idaho Trans. Bd., 797
P.2d 1383, 1384 (Idaho 1990), where a contractor was not allowed to recover in
quantum meruit for work done on a void contract. However, the contractor was
allowed to retain the payments that had been made which exceeded the original
contract price because the state did not properly appeal the award. Id. at 1385.
Compare Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444, 447 (La. 1974) where the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana denied profit recovery and limited the contractor to
recovering expenses that were incurred in performance on a void contract. The
court ruled that when parties act in good faith in an attempt to form a contract
and there is no fraud, the party that receives the benefit of the invalid contract
may be responsible for the expenses incurred by the other party. Id.
155. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
156. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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barred from making any payments?..7 If the agency is barred
from making payments, should the agency be entitled to re-
imbursement of all monies paid to the contractor?'58 What
are the ramifications of a court declaring a contract void after
substantial performance has occurred on the original con-
tract?"5 How should courts determine if the competitive bid-
ding process took place?6 ° Is the bidder that was wrongfully
denied the contract entitled to damages resulting from denial
of the contract award?' Instead of declaring the contract
void, is there a better solution for courts asked to rule on bid
imperfection cases in the future?'62 Is there a need for reme-
dial legislation?' The following sections attempt to analyze
these questions.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Valley Crest Court's Unclear Rationale Behind Citing
Early California Precedent
The Valley Crest court expressly refused to opine on a
contractor's right to recover for the reasonable value of its
services after a contract is declared void.' Thus, it is incon-
sistent that the court would cite Miller"' and other appellate
court cases"' where, in each case, the court denied recovery
to the contractor who performed work on a void contract.
Perhaps the Valley Crest court was hinting that it, too, would
deny recovery to a contractor in a situation where a defect in
the bidding process occurs. One can only speculate how far
courts could extend the early precedent of Miller and other
similar cases.
No case has directly addressed the question of whether a
court will allow recovery to a contractor who performs work
157. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C, V.A, V.C.
158. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
159. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
160. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
161. See discussion infra Part V.B.
162. See discussion infra Part V.D-E.
163. See discussion infra Part V.F.
164. See supra Part II.A.1.
165. Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942).
166. Greer v. Hitchcock, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Gamewell
F.A.T. Co. v. Los Angeles, 187 P. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919); Reams v. Cooley, 152
P. 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915); Zottman v. San Francisco, 81 Am. Dec. 96 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1862).
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on a contract that is later deemed void because of a defect in
the bidding process, as opposed to the situation in Miller,
where no competitive bidding procedure ever took place.'67
California courts may be willing to extend Miller to bar re-
covery for technical errors in the bidding process or they may
restrict Miller to include only situations that fail to use any
competitive bidding procedure.
B. The Gross Inequity of Not Paying a Contractor
The costs contractors would have to absorb if they were
denied recovery on a void contract because of a later found
technical flaw in their bid could be staggering. For instance,
in Valley Crest,'68 the contractor had completed 98% of the
work on a contract and received $3.4 million of the $4.1 mil-
lion adjusted contract price before the contract was declared
void.'69 If the void contract rule was applied to this situation,
as suggested in Miller,70 the contractor would not only be de-
nied recovery of any outstanding money owed on the contract,
but would also be required to reimburse the public entity for
the $3.4 million dollars that the contractor had already re-
ceived.
Furthermore, in Monterey Mechanical, by the time the
contract was declared void, work had been proceeding for
about two years.' Approximately $44 million had been paid
on the $65.8 million contract. 7 ' Applying the Miller rule, the
contractor would be required to reimburse the public entity
$44 million because of the declaration two years later, that
the contract is void.
Contractors would essentially be forced to work for free
in these situations. One might suggest that contractors faced
with this dilemma call on their subcontractors for reim-
bursement of all payments received for work performed in
order to repay the public entity. However, if this were the
case, innocent subcontractors would be required to shoulder
the loss, despite the fact that they were not parties to the
167. All early precedent cases involve situations where there was no com-
petitive bidding.
168. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
169. Diepenbrock, supra note 39, at 3.
170. Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942).
171. Malakoff, supra note 69, at 3.
172. Id.
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contract with the public entity. Furthermore, such a practice
would directly contravene the intent of all bonding statutes
173
designed to insure that subcontractors receive payment for
their services.
The notion of not paying a contractor for work performed
in good faith reliance on a promise given by the public entity
to pay for the work is simply not fair to the contractor. If
courts were to adopt such a rule, gross inequities would
surely result as public entities make off with the gold while
the contractors would be left holding the bag.
C. Paying a Contractor Benefits the Public
Recognition of a contractor's right to recover on a void
contract in the absence of bad faith benefits the public. 174 By
preventing losses to innocent contractors, the public entity's
procurement system is preserved, while still restricting the
government from entering into contracts with impunity.7 1 If
contractors are denied recovery in good faith situations, pru-
dent contractors will become much less interested in bidding
on public contracts.'76 Failing to hold a public entity liable
when a contract is declared void will remove the incentive for
public officials to review their contracts to ensure compliance
with all statutes and regulations.
77
To illustrate this problem, imagine a situation with an
unscrupulous public official. 78  The official could enter the
contract knowing there is an illegality, let the contractor per-
form, and then not be held accountable for payment. 9
Therefore, allowing contractor recovery retains the division
between the entity as sovereign and as a contracting party.
180
If the public entity is acting as a contracting party, then it
cannot be allowed to take advantage of other parties to the
contract because of its sovereign position.' After all, to say,
173. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3247-3248 (Deering 1985).
174. Janik & Rhodes, supra note 128, at 1951.
175. Id.
176. O'Conner & Beck, supra note 9, at 6.
177. Janik & Rhodes, supra note 128, at 1951.
178. Id. at 1974.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1951.
181. Id. "It is no less good morals and good law that the Government should
turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn
square corners in dealing with their government." Id. at 1978 (citing Maxima
Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting St. Regis
1997] 225
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"'The joke is on you. You shouldn't have trusted us,' is hardly
worthy of our great government."182
D. Labeling a Contract Void Is Problematic
A myriad of problems stem from a contract being labeled
void. First, labeling a contract void immediately halts per-
formance on the project. The project must sit idle while the
municipality re-lets the remaining portion of the work.'83
This could take considerable time and result in enormous ex-
pense to the public entity.'84 As the previous cited case law
demonstrates, oftentimes there is only a small portion of the
work remaining. 85
Second, unless the original contractor bids on the re-
maining work and is the low bidder, the original contractor
will not be allowed to complete the project. In many in-
stances, new contractors will have to pick up the project be-
ing totally unfamiliar with any of the work that has been ac-
complished to date. These new contractors will not have the
advantage of the learning curves that the original contractors
and subcontractors will have had. Furthermore, no matter
what contractor is awarded the remaining portion of the
work, the cost of the completion of the project will surely be
more than it would have been had the original contract been
affirmed.
Third, a contractor's performance and payment bonds
would now be void and entirely innocent subcontractors and
suppliers who furnished work and materials no longer would
have the security of a bond for payment.'86 These contractors
are left in legal limbo, possibly facing years of protracted liti-
gation seeking payment for their work and materials."'
Finally, the public entity no longer has warranty rights
under the original contract since there is no longer a con-
Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)).
182. Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970).
183. O'Conner & Beck, supra note 9, at 4.
184. For example, in Monterey Mechanical, the public entity's schedule for
completing construction of a wastewater treatment plant was crucial. Malak-
off, supra note 69, at 3. A late project delivery would create a risk to the public
health, cost tremendous expense if the capacity to the existing wastewater
treatment plant was exceeded, and subject the public entity to liquidated dam-
ages claims. Id.
185. O'Conner & Beck, supra note 9, at 4; see discussion supra Part IV.B.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
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tract.'88 Therefore, the public entity is left with an unwarran-
tied project. If problems are later found that involve the
original contractor's work, the public entity will not have the
ability to ensure that the contractor will repair any faulty
workmanship.
E. The Speculative Bid Bond Test
The issue of what constitutes competitive bidding is
germane to the idea of adopting quantum meruit recovery on
void contracts and, therefore, should be addressed. The Val-
ley Crest test to determine whether competitive bidding oc-
curred relies on the question of whether a contractor could or
could not have revoked its bid bond.18 ' However, the problem
with this test is that in many cases involving a defective bid,
the defect is questionable. Municipalities, in determining the
responsiveness of a bid, are forced to define the difference be-
tween a minor and a major irregularity. Minor irregularities
are waivable, whereas major irregularities are not.90 Often-
times, these municipalities have no precedent to guide them
and must rely on general reasonableness in arriving at a de-
cision.
As we have learned over the course of legal history, rea-
sonableness is not the easiest term to define. What is a rea-
sonable, minor irregularity to one person may not be to an-
other. Because of this nebulous gauge, public officials are put
in the difficult situation of having to use their best judgment
in declaring a bid either responsive or nonresponsive. As has
been seen, a disgruntled bidder will often challenge a con-
tract award. Using hindsight, this disgruntled bidder can of-
ten find something wrong with the bid, no matter how min-
ute and inconsequential the error may be. If this upset
bidder can find a judge or jury whose perception of reason-
188. "A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the existence
of a fact upon which the other party may rely .... BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY
526 (3d ed. 1991) (emphasis added). It would be difficult to argue that war-
ranty rights should remain, despite a finding that there is no contract, as one
would be telling the contractor he or she cannot be paid for any work rendered,
but must still honor its contractual warranty of good workmanship even though
there is no longer a valid contract. Such an inconsistent notion cannot be justi-
fied and would result in manifest unfairness to the contractor.
189. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
190. Id. at 190.
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ableness differs from that of the public official's, then the
award can be set aside.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Payment to the Original Contractor Should Be Allowed
Under a quantum meruit theory, payments should be
allowed to a contractor whose contract is retroactively de-
clared void after the award, as long as good faith competitive
bidding occurred. To do otherwise would place public con-
tractors in a difficult situation. If the contractor questions
the contract award and refuses to commence performance,
the contractor could forfeit its bid bond. Alternatively, if the
contractor decides to begin performance on the contract and
the contract is later declared void by a court, it would deny
the contractor recovery, despite the fact that the illegality
question is very close. In such a situation, the contractor
would be forced to restrain him or herself from performance
on the contract until the illegality question is resolved.
Resolution could take years with California's overcrowded
courts and lengthy appeals processes, as well as cost the con-
tractor dearly.
As previously noted, many federal and state courts
across the country have allowed public contractors to recover
for their performance on void contracts, even when competi-
tive bidding did not occur.' While some California precedent
has permitted payment to contractors on void contracts,'92 at
least one supreme court decision suggests that recovery
should be denied.'93 Nevertheless, California courts should
take a middle ground approach. Courts should limit quan-
tum meruit recovery on void contracts to instances where
competitive bidding occurred and there was good faith on be-
half of the parties to the contract. This will allow a retention
of early California precedent, while still being fair to both the
general public and innocent contractors who have performed
work for which they would otherwise be uncompensated. The
remedies available should depend on what stage of perform-
ance the contractor is in at the time of the notification that
191. See supra Part II.F.
192. See supra Part II.D.
193. See supra Part II.C.
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the contract has been declared void.
For instance, where contract performance has begun but
has not yet been completed, recovery should be limited to the
value of the benefit conferred to the public entity. If a con-
tract has been awarded but performance has not begun, the
contractor's recovery should be limited to any expenses in-
curred (mobilization costs, purchases in reliance of contract,
equipment rentals, etc.) as a result of the public entity's late
notice of termination. Finally, if performance on the contract
has been completed prior to a finding that the contract is
void, the contractor's recovery should be the contract price.
B. Promissory Estoppel Recovery for an Unsuccessful Bidder
Wrongfully Denied a Contract
An action in promissory estoppel' should be allowed
against the public entity if a bidder is wrongfully denied a
contract.195 After all, it was the public entity who made the
mistake in entering the contract in violation of the bidding
rules,96 and since the public entity made the final decision to
award the contract, the public entity should be responsible
for the costs incurred as a result of its mistake. Allowing fi-
nancial recovery in such instances is justified because it is
usually not practical to re-award a contract to the unsuccess-
ful bidder after performance has been begun by another con-
tractor. In public works projects, general contractors have
probably already lost all of their commitments from their
subcontractors and can likely no longer do the job for their
originally submitted bid price. In many cases, substantial
performance has been rendered by the original contractor,
and the scope of the job has been drastically reduced. It usu-
ally does not make sense to award the contract to the pro-
testing bidder previously denied the job. Therefore, damages
should be paid as a remedy to these contractors, but recovery
should be limited to expenses the unsuccessful bidder in-
curred in bid preparation, along with any resulting court
194. "The promissor, having induced reliance on his promise by the other
party, is said to be estopped from denying the existence of a contract, though in
fact one has not been made." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 379 (3d ed. 1991).
195. Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Selby County, 648 F.2d 1084, 1096 (6th Cir.
1981).
196. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Department of Transp. & Pub. Facili-
ties, 765 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Alaska 1988).
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costs.'97 Furthermore, recovery should only be allowed in the
absence of fraud, 9 ' bad faith,199 and grossly misleading ac-
tions °° by the unsuccessful bidder. A similar form of recovery
has already been allowed for unsuccessful bidders in Califor-
nia.
201
C. Deny Contractor Recovery Only Where Contracts Have
Not Been Sent Out for Competitive Bidding
The rule in Miller 2 and other cases,0 3 which deny recov-
ery to contractors in situations where contracts were not sent
out for competitive bidding, should be limited to those situa-
tions. If a municipality properly advertises and sends out a
contract for public bidding, then the competitive bidding
process did, in fact, take place. Miller should not be extended
in such instances where a bidding process takes place but is
later found to be technically flawed. To do so would produce
grossly inequitable results.
197. Owen of Georgia, Inc., 648 F.2d at 1096.
198. An example of fraud is when a contractor colludes with a public officer
to fix or rig a bid by finding out another confidential bid price under seal that
has already been submitted to the public officer by a competing contractor.
199. An example of bad faith would be if a contractor has actual knowledge
that procedures being followed violate bidding requirements and the contractor
still proceeds with performance on the wrongfully awarded contract. See
Schoenbrod v. United States, 410 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
200. An example of grossly misleading actions would be if the prevailing con-
tractor submits a non-conforming sample in support of his bid, the noncon-
formity of which is not apparent until tests are performed after contract award.
See Prestex, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
201. See Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood, 114 Cal. Rptr. 834
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (suggesting a low bidder might obtain relief on a theory of
promissory estoppel, damages being limited to the cost of preparing the bid).
But see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(b) (Deering 1963) ("Except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act
or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune
from liability."). See also Pacific Architects Collaborative v. State of California,
166 Cal. Rptr. 184, 188-89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Rubino v. Lolli, 89 Cal. Rptr.
320, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that because the award of a public con-
tract involves the exercise of discretion, government employees and entities in-
volved are immune from liability).
202. Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1942).
203. Greer v. Hitchcock, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Gamewell
F.A.T. Co. v. Los Angeles, 187 P. 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919); Reams v. Cooley, 152
P. 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915); Zottman v. San Francisco, 81 Am. Dec. 96 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1862).
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D. Avoid Labeling the Contract Void
As previously discussed, the theory of quantum meruit is
a viable theory of recovery for contractors that perform on
contracts later deemed void because of defects in the pro-
curement process."4 However, courts should refrain from la-
beling such contracts void so that the contractor's options are
limited to actions in quantum meruit. Although quantum
meruit recovery is certainly more desirable than disallowing
any payment to the contractor, it does still have some draw-
backs for both the public entity and the contractor which can
be avoided. As an alternative to declaring contracts void
when technical defects are found in the bidding process,
courts should affirm the contract and allow the original con-
tractor to complete performance on a contract. When there is
a public construction project that has been substantially
completed, it is neither practical nor financially viable for the
public entity to have to cease construction and re-let the re-
mainder of the project. Courts should follow the reasoning in
Ghilotti °5 and avoid the rigidity employed by Valley Crest.6
and Monterey Mechanical. °7
E. The Speculative Bid Bond Test Should Be Abandoned
California courts should depart from the reasoning em-
ployed by the Valley Crest court to determine what consti-
tutes competitive bidding. The court's test, which looks at
whether a contractor could or could not have revoked his bid
bond, is too speculative. As discussed above,0 8 what is a rea-
sonable, minor irregularity to one person may not be to the
next. Therefore, it is fair to allow the public officer the bene-
fit of the doubt. Unless the parties acted in bad faith, courts
should hold that the competitive bidding process did occur
where the contract was properly let out for public bidding,
despite any technical flaw in the bid that is discovered at a
later date. The court's dicta in Ghilotti °9 uses much of the
204. See discussion supra Part II.F.
205. Ghilotti Constr. Co. v. City of Richmond, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
206. Valley Crest Landscape, Inc. v. City Council of Davis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
207. Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Sacramento Reg'l County Sanitation Dist.,
52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
208. See discussion supra Part IV.E.
209. Ghilotti Constr. Co. v. City of Richmond, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 389; see dis-
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same equitable reasoning and, therefore, should be fol-
lowed.21°
F. The Need for New Legislation
Both the public and public contractors could benefit from
new legislation. Such legislation should mandate non-
appealable, binding arbitration.. for all claims, that would
take place within days after a contract award, in order to
solve many of the problems that spawn from defective bids.
This would save both the public and contractors bidding on
public jobs an enormous amount of time and money, as well
as help streamline the bid dispute process. Proposed legisla-
tion, such as that which has been suggested by legal advisors
on the committee for the Associated General Contractors,
should be seriously considered by state lawmakers.212
VI. CONCLUSION
Serious doubts have been cast in California regarding a
contractor's right of recovery on a contract later deemed void
because of a flaw in the bidding process. Innocent public con-
tractors are in serious risk of not being paid for work per-
formed on such contracts, regardless of how much money was
expended in the process. Because of this concern, California
courts should adopt the approaches that have been utilized in
other state and federal courts which have proven both effec-
tive and fair in dealing with public contracts that are de-
clared void.
First, absent fraud or bad faith, quantum meruit recov-
ery should be allowed to contractors when contracts are
cussion supra Part II.D.
210. The Ghilotti court explained that public entities may waive inconse-
quential deviations from contract specifications in a public contract bid as long
as the deviation neither gave the bidder an "unfair competitive advantage" or
defeated "the goals of insuring economy and preventing corruption in the public
contracting process." 53 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The principle underlying the doc-
trine of inconsequential irregularities in Ghilotti is if good faith is present and
the general public will not be injured, innocent people should not be punished.
This reasoning should also be adopted in assessing a contractor's right of recov-
ery for work performed on a void contract that was properly let out for competi-
tive bidding.
211. Claims arising under the State Contract Act are resolved by arbitration.
ACRET, supra note 70, at 258. However, it does not appear that disappointed
bidders fall under the ambit of the arbitration mandate of the State Contract
Act because they are not parties to a contract.
212. See O'Conner, supra note 9, at 1-3.
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properly sent out for competitive bidding and a defect in the
bidding process is determined after the contract is awarded.
Second, municipalities should grant promissory estoppel re-
lief to bidders that are wrongfully denied contracts for any
reasonable costs that were incurred in bid preparation.
Third, early California precedent denying quantum meruit
recovery on void contracts should be limited to situations
where the competitive bidding procedure took place. Fourth,
courts in the future should decline to declare public contracts
void when no obvious defect in the bidding process occurred.
Fifth, in determining whether or not competitive bidding took
place, courts should depart from focusing on the question of
whether or not a contractor could have withdrawn its bid and
recovered its bid bond, because such an inquiry is too often
purely speculative. Finally, new legislation should be consid-
ered for more efficient and timely resolution of public con-
tract bid disputes.
There are many uncertainties with California's current
approach in resolving bid disputes in public contracting. If
ideas such as those asserted in this comment are imple-
mented, municipalities, contractors, subcontractors, material
suppliers, and the general public will all benefit. California
courts and the legislature should adopt these equitable and
common sense approaches to dealing with bid disputes so as
to ensure a better future for public contracting.
John Reid Montgomery
19971 233

